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Article 9

MODERNITY’S
REGIMES OF
WONDERMENT
Jonathan P. Eburne and
Aaron Jaffe
Curious Visions of Modernity:
Enchantment, Magic, and the
Sacred by David L. Martin.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2011. xviii + 255 pages. $32.95
cloth.

When Walter Benjamin writes in
Convolute N of the Arcades Project
that he has “nothing to say, only to
show,” does anyone really believe
him?1 David L. Martin cites this
well-known statement in the first
pages of his excellent study Curious
Visions of Modernity. He does so
less to explain his own methods,
however, than to invoke something of a modernist incantation.
Indeed, Benjamin’s dictum echoes
a line by Pablo Picasso borrowed
by Jacques Lacan in Seminar 11:
“I do not seek, I find.”2 Where we
might expect to find a statement of
method, Lacan instead presents us
with findings. As Sigmund Freud
said, “Wo es war, soll ich werden.”
(Where it [the id] was, I [the ego]
shall be.) What is curious, though,
is that the claim itself—“I don’t
seek, I find”—discloses the very
methodological reflection it professes to withhold, albeit in the
form of a borrowed line, a resonant
fragment of historical discourse.
By the time Lacan gets to
Seminar 24, moreover, even finding
is off the table: “Long ago, I happened to say, imitating a famous
painter, ‘I don’t seek, I find.’ At
the point I’m at now, I don’t find
as long as I don’t seek.”3 Of course,
there’s more to such statements
than merely the showy disavowal
of method—how could there not
be? Still, there’s something of the
conjuring trick in these inscrutable mottos. Don’t find, don’t seek,
don’t even tell: our eyes are directed
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elsewhere, thereby sustaining the
master’s sleight of hand. Such
claims thus amount to something
other than a hermeneutic (or an
object-oriented ontology). Rather
than inducing us to heed the call
of things from within the tangle
of discourse that enshrouds them,
these utterances instead comprise
the magic words of philosophical
stagecraft, a theoretical version of
welcome to the show, presto, hocus
pocus, abracadabra. Reason supplies
its own magic words: the terms saying, showing, seeking, finding, and
telling all have ordinary meanings,
yet they are no less caught up in the
irrational constellation of terms in
Martin’s subtitle—enchantment,
magic, and the sacred. Insofar as
these common participles also
underwrite the formation of modern rationality of the scientific sort,
they also have complex critical
genealogies, which Martin’s book
aims to trace.
In his three-part study of early
modern cabinets of curiosity, anatomical specimens, and pictorial
technologies, Martin examines the
“stagecraft” that underpins the way
modern science—not to mention
philosophy—has been able to make
inert matter speak (60). Michel
Foucault, whose work underpins
Martin’s study in profound ways,
named his version of this stagecraft
“archaeology.” Benjamin likens his
own approach to montage. Martin’s
is more akin to Industrial Light and
Magic, full of stunning archival

pyrotechnics, and appropriate to
the “regime of wonderment” he
wants to rescue. As Martin writes,
When the task of the scholar
was to get objects to speak
of the truth that was hidden
within them, a truth that
only the object itself fully
“knew,” illumination came
through an act of unpacking the microcosmic collection, of arranging the words
of the text of creation so that
one might interpret the signatures inscribed within all
things. In this setting, the
fake often pointed to higher
truths. (45)
Like Benjamin, Martin is interested
in exhibiting telling fragments; he
indicates by pointing out, illustrating, and illuminating. On this front,
he offers a telling confession: “For
many years,” he writes, “I have been
something of an academic collector, watching out for fragments and
broken pieces of early modern visual
culture discarded and scattered by
the vagaries of historical discourse”
(xi). What he exhibits in Curious
Visions are holdovers of early modern curiosity—“the fragment, the
narrative, the excursion, the fleeting glance, the sympathy, and the
resonance” (ix)—that animate the
scientific practices he features in
his book: the assembly of collections, the examination of human
anatomy, and the making of maps.

ON CURIOUS VISIONS OF MODERNITY
Martin shows how these things
disclose their theatrical and talis
manic powers in curiosity cabinets,
operation theaters, and map rooms,
and then how they harden into the
disciplinary apparatus of scientific
rationality in museology, anatomy,
and cartography. The book’s second
section on the twinned discovery
of the corpse and the corpus of
knowledge is especially striking,

laying out how the handling of the
dead invigorates and haunts the
structures of knowledge that inform
medical science, through the work
of the anatomist Andreas Vesalius,
as well as Rembrandt’s Anatomy
Lesson of Dr Nicolaes Tulp (1632).
Here, as throughout his study,
Martin’s project of scholarship-ascollecting bears a double imperative:
On the one hand, it documents how
the curious, wondrous, and even
magical qualities of such heterogeneous corpuses become the very
means through which early modern
scientific practices establish norms.
The “fabulous exemplar” becomes,
in other words, a technology for
disciplinary regulation. On the
other hand, Martin’s work strives
to restore to such exemplars the heterogeneity and strangeness against
which they have been instrumentalized; for Martin, modern rationality is always shot through with the
fragmentary curiosities from which
it emerged.
As its archaeological project suggests, Martin’s book owes as much
to Foucault as to Benjamin; its three
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principal sites of attention—collections, bodies, and spaces—stand
in for Foucault’s favorite genealogical haunts: mental asylums,
prisons, and natural histories. The
theoretical pairing of Benjamin
and Foucault effects a productive
synthesis for Martin in his “‘archaeology’ of the visual,” which, as
he writes, is “aimed precisely at
redressing the modern proclivity
toward the production of monuments” (xv). Curious Visions is very
much a book about method, but a
book that refuses to reify its methodology as anything other than a set
of performances and magical tricks.
The project is well suited to the
capacious multidisciplinary zone of
visual studies, engaging and implicating the fields of museology, art
history, anthropology, science, and
postcolonial studies. His approach
is suspicious of textuality and the
linguistic turn: “Modernity’s binary
relationship between signs and their
signifiers has tended to conflate
the act of writing with the logic of
the catalog: tying down ideas and
meaning in definitive forms. In
this regard, the modern commentary errs towards assessment and
opposition, not the invitation to recollection” (42). Martin’s suspicion
toward telling—and toward discursivity more broadly—nevertheless yields a substantive proposition
for contemporary scholarship—
namely, that we heed the magic
words of propositional discourse as
part of the show.
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In his conclusion, Martin
recounts an anecdote that reflects
on the book’s overall argument
about the oddly irrational and heterogeneous practices of curiosity
that undergird the development of
scientific rationality. Explaining to
a car full of acquaintances his thesis,
for instance, that the epistemology of
modern medical science was predicated on dead bodies rather than on
living ones, Martin tells his audience that “when we walk into a doctor’s surgery it is a dead body that is
presented before them, not our vital
and living body” (178). Not only
has the anatomical gaze of medical
science long been founded on the
study of cadavers, but, as Martin
contends, the “normative body”
of the medical discipline derives
from the profession’s recourse to
“inert, dissected, criminal bodies”
(71) during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his concluding
anecdote, Martin reports that one
of his interlocutors, an incredulous marine scientist, retorted, “I’m
sorry, David. I don’t think any doctor would agree with you. I know,
for one, that when a specimen is in
front of me, I imagine it as alive, it is
a living body that I see and to which
my observations are directed” (178).
The point of Martin’s anecdote is
less to bolster the immediate historicist claim that the cadaver figures
strongly in the genealogy of the
medical discipline than to register
a blind spot in scientific resistance
to his archaeological scholarship.

What makes the anecdote telling is
that this response mirrors his point
but does not refute it. The discussant sees the dead specimen as alive
but doesn’t notice how this sleight
of hand depends on an operation of
“revelation and concealment” (188).
Martin’s argument here bears
a latent, yet insistent, political
charge. His anecdote is reminiscent of an old joke about a car
mechanic and a surgeon, in which
their difference in professional
status comes down to the same
distinction between living and
dead bodies. Having repaired the
surgeon’s car—meticulously stripping its engine, cleaning each part,
and reassembling the vehicle—the
mechanic returns the keys to his
wealthy customer and says, “You
know, you and I are really quite the
same. We both open up the bodies
of the patients we work on, expose
the guts, and fix all the right parts
in order to keep the machine up
and running. Yet it’s you who gets
paid the big bucks. Why is this?”
The surgeon impatiently takes
the keys, waits a beat, and then
replies, “Yes, well, try repairing
it while the engine is running.”
The joke, as Martin demonstrates
throughout his book, is tied to the
epistemological double vision of
modern reason: it privileges both
the implicit humanism of the living, the organic engine over the
inorganic mechanism of the car,
and the procedural distinction
between working on a running

ON CURIOUS VISIONS OF MODERNITY
motor and working on an arrested
one. Yet, to the extent that the joke
works, its proposition directs us to
the mechanic’s insight: the surgeon’s condescending distinction
exhausts the show in the tell by
reinforcing the ideologically commonplace hierarchy—reminiscent
of the surgeon’s superiority to the
barber—which the mechanic’s
remark breaks with a fascinating,
if disarmingly literal, spell of epistemological continuity.
Martin’s own meditations on
the role of curiosity and magical
thinking in the function of discourse come to light in his conclusion to the anecdote. As Martin
reflects, the notion that the surgeon would see “only a living
body” is, he writes, “precisely the
point of the matter: that modern
science is possessed of a gaze that
allows its practitioners to envisage (or, should I say, have visions
of) the dead-as-living” (178).
The contemporary practice of
medicine may be removed from
the sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury practice of illustrating
flayed and dissected cadavers as
animated, classically posed bodies, yet the rhetorical strategy of
bringing such corpses to life, of
subsuming the dead bodies and
specimen part-objects of medical experimentation and training
within an disciplinary framework
of “life science,” persists with “the
very discursive structures of scientific practice itself, as an innate,
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prescient scientific ‘vision’” (179).
“Viewing, tracing and exploring the ambivalent ‘desire’ as a
function of discourse” means to
tell without telling all, so as not
to exhaust the show in the process. Martin’s Curious Visions thus
strives to restore some of the vital
glamour to knowledge, and some
of the magic to erudition.
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